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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 14-4080
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellant
v.
WILLIE TYLER, a/k/a “Little Man”
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 1-96-cr-00106-001)
District Judge: Hon. William W. Caldwell
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 17, 2015
Before: FISHER, CHAGARES, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: September 21, 2015)
_______________
OPINION
_______________
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
This case is before us for the fourth time, now on the government’s appeal from an
order of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granting



This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7,
does not constitute binding precedent.

a new trial to Willie Tyler under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Because we are bound by the prior
panel’s decision in United States v. Tyler (Tyler III), 732 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2013), we will
affirm.
I.

BACKGROUND
The underlying facts are set forth more fully in Tyler III, 732 F.3d at 243-46, and

we provide only a brief recap. Willie Tyler was charged under state law for the murder
of a witness who was scheduled to testify at his brother’s state trial. Tyler was acquitted
of the murder charge, but was convicted of witness intimidation and served a term in state
prison. After his release, federal prosecutors brought charges for witness tampering by
murder and by intimidation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A) and (C) and 18
U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1), (2), and (3), respectively. At Tyler’s federal trial, the jury was
instructed about two theories of guilt: tampering with a witness to prevent her testimony
at an official proceeding and tampering with a witness to prevent her communication
with law enforcement. After the jury convicted Tyler by way of a general verdict that did
not specify the theory of guilt, we reversed his conviction on grounds not relevant to this
appeal. United States v. Tyler (Tyler I), 164 F.3d 150, 159 (3d Cir. 1998). He was then
retried and convicted again of two counts of tampering with a witness – by murder and by
intimidation – and sentenced to life in prison. On direct appeal, we affirmed his
conviction and sentence. United States v. Tyler (Tyler II), 281 F.3d 84 (3d Cir. 2002).
Tyler then filed pro se motions arguing that the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) and Fowler v. United States,
131 S. Ct. 2045 (2011), rendered him innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted
2

because the government could not show a nexus between his conduct and an official
federal proceeding and because his conduct was not aimed at preventing a
communication with a federal law enforcement officer. Tyler III, 732 F.3d at 245-46.
The District Court construed his motions as a petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, which it denied. Id. at 246.
On appeal, we concluded that the record demonstrated entitlement to relief on both
of the legal theories Tyler advanced, the “official proceeding” theory based on Arthur
Andersen, 544 U.S. at 707-08 (holding that certain official proceeding provisions of
§ 1512 require proof of a “nexus” between the defendant’s conduct and a particular
federal proceeding), and the “communication” theory based on Fowler, 131 S. Ct. at.
2052-53 (holding that the investigation-related communication provision of § 1512
requires proof of a communication to a federal law enforcement officer or judge). Tyler
III, 732 F.3d at 249-53. Accordingly, a divided panel remanded the case for the District
Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to allow Tyler an opportunity to pursue his
claims of actual innocence.1 Id. at 252-53. In directing the procedure for the District
Court to follow upon remand, we instructed that:

The dissent disagreed with the panel’s disposition, arguing that, under Bousley v.
United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998), and Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), in order to
demonstrate “actual innocence,” Tyler had to show that, in light of all the evidence, it
was more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him. Tyler III,
732 F.3d at 254 (Shwartz, J., dissenting). The dissent agreed with the majority that no
reasonable juror could have convicted Tyler under the “official proceeding” theory of
§ 1512, but could not say that no reasonable juror would have convicted Tyler under the
“communication” theory. Id. at 256-57. The dissent concluded that, if a juror was
properly instructed, Tyler could have been convicted under the communication theory.
Id. at 257-58. Relying on the more-demanding standard that applies in collateral attack
1
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If the District Court concludes that Tyler has met his burden of establishing
his actual innocence as to both theories, then it must issue the writ of habeas
corpus and vacate Tyler’s convictions, pursuant to § 2241. If, however, the
District Court concludes that Tyler has met his burden of establishing his
actual innocence based on either the official proceeding provisions or the
investigation-related communication provisions, but not both, then it must
fashion a remedy in light of the general verdict reached in this case… .
Generally, when a jury returns a general verdict and the evidence is
insufficient to support a conviction on one legal theory but sufficient to
convict on another theory, then the reviewing court should let the verdict
stand, assuming that the jury convicted on the factually sufficient theory.
However, when one of two or more alternative theories supporting a count
of conviction is either (1) unconstitutional, or (2) legally invalid, then the
reviewing court should vacate the jury verdict and remand for a new trial
without the invalid or unconstitutional theory. … Thus, if the District Court
concludes that Tyler has failed to establish his actual innocence based on one
but not both legal theories, then it may not let the verdict stand, and instead
it must order a new trial based only on the legally valid theory.
Tyler III, 732 F.3d at 253 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The
government then successfully sought an extension of time to move for rehearing en banc,
but ultimately never did so.2 Thus, our mandate issued and the case was returned to the
District Court.
On remand, the government conceded that Tyler was actually innocent under the
“official proceeding” theory but maintained that he was guilty under the
“communication” theory.3 United States v. Tyler, 35 F. Supp. 3d 650, 653 & n.3 (M.D.

proceedings, the dissent concluded that a new trial was not warranted, notwithstanding
the general verdict. Id.
2

The government also failed to petition for certiorari from the Supreme Court of
the United States.
3

The parties agreed on remand to rely on the record evidence rather than conduct
an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Tyler, 35 F. Supp. 3d 650, 651 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
4

Pa. 2014). The District Court concluded that a reasonable juror could find Tyler was
guilty under the “communication” theory and that Tyler’s arguments on that issue were
“better made to a jury.” Id. at 656. Accordingly, based on our direction in Tyler III, the
District Court concluded that it must grant Tyler a new trial. Id. (“[T]he Third Circuit has
instructed us that if Defendant has established his actual innocence on only one of the
provisions but not on the other, we must vacate both convictions and grant a new trial on
the one provision that would be a valid basis for conviction.”).4
The government then filed an appeal of the District Court’s order and sought
initial hearing en banc. Specifically, the government argued – perhaps correctly but,
without doubt, belatedly – that the Tyler III majority improperly imported the lessdemanding standard of review for a direct appeal into this collateral review proceeding.
We rejected the government’s petition for initial hearing en banc and the appeal is now
before this panel for resolution.
II.

DISCUSSION5
As a threshold matter, we must discuss our jurisdiction to hear the appeal, which

Tyler calls into question.
Contrary to Tyler’s assertions, we have jurisdiction over this case because it
involves the grant of a new criminal trial in a collateral attack proceeding, United States

4

The government apparently did not argue before the District Court that a new
trial was inappropriate. (Gov’t Reply Br. at 15-17 & n.3.)
5

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Our jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 is disputed, as discussed below.
5

v. Allen, 613 F.2d 1248, 1250-52 (3d Cir. 1980) (grant of new trial to habeas petitioner
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 constitutes final, appealable order), and because the government
has identified a purported error by which it is aggrieved, albeit one dictated by our
decision in Tyler III,6 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
Tyler also argues, though, that the government has forfeited its challenge to the
District Court’s grant of a new trial because it never argued before the District Court that
such a remedy was inappropriate. In its protestations to the contrary, the government
essentially concedes the point, both by setting forth the plain error standard of review for
unpreserved claims, and by claiming that the issue was preserved because the
government informed the District Court during two off-the-record conversations that it
disagreed with the remedy instructions in Tyler III and that it intended to seek en banc
review of that decision “if authorized to do so by the Solicitor General.” (Gov’t Reply
Br. at 15-17 & n.3.) Tyler is correct that, generally, the failure to raise an issue before a
district court results in its forfeiture on appeal. Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 74-75 (3d
Cir. 2006). We nevertheless have discretion to consider an issue that was not raised
below, particularly if it is a “pure question of law … [and] refusal to reach the issue
would result in a miscarriage of justice or where the issue’s resolution is of public
importance.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the government argues that it
would have been futile to lodge an objection to the District Court’s grant of a new trial,

Tyler is correct, however, that the government does not set forth any “issues
presented” for our review in its opening brief, though its statement of subject matter and
appellate jurisdiction clearly identifies that it is seeking an appeal of the District Court’s
order granting a new trial.
6
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given the mandate that court was operating under after Tyler III. (Gov’t Reply Br. at 16.)
See Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 372 F.3d 193, 203 n.13 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Under
the mandate rule, a species of the law of the case doctrine, a trial court must comply
strictly with the mandate directed to it by the reviewing court.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
We need not decide whether to exercise our discretion and reach the purportedly
forfeited issue, however, because – as the parties should be well aware – this panel is
limited by what has gone before in this case, just as was the District Court. A previous
panel has already declared that, if Tyler is innocent under the official proceeding theory
but not the communication theory, he is entitled to a new trial as a matter of law. Tyler
III, 732 F.3d at 253. Under the law of the case doctrine, we are not free to disturb that
ruling, even if we believe it to be in error. In re City of Phila. Litig., 158 F.3d 711, 717
(3d Cir. 1998) (“Under the law of the case doctrine, one panel of an appellate court
generally will not reconsider questions that another panel has decided on a prior appeal in
the same case.”). Because the government failed to move for rehearing en banc
following our decision in Tyler III and because this Court declined to grant initial hearing
en banc in this appeal, we must affirm the ruling of the District Court granting Tyler a
new trial. The government is, of course, free to seek en banc review of this decision
should it choose to do so, because there may yet be a few bites left on the apple.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, we will affirm the ruling of the District Court.
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